Review of Albert Hirschman’s The Strategy of Economic Development

Context and Purpose

Hirschman’s book emerged in the post-WWII era when many newly independent nations were grappling with the challenge of rapid industrialization and modernization. Traditional growth models emphasized balanced expansion and capital accumulation. Hirschman, drawing on his advisory work in Colombia, offered a different, more pragmatic and dynamic framework: development should proceed through deliberate imbalances that stimulate further investment and institutional responses.

He framed his work as a strategy rather than a fixed model, emphasizing decision-making under uncertainty and the catalytic role of specific investments.

Core Ideas

The main ideas proposed in the text were:

Development as Disequilibrium

Rather than seeking balance from the outset, Hirschman argued that growth is best advanced through a “chain of disequilibria.”

Imbalances create pressures, tensions, and opportunities that force societies to mobilize latent resources and capabilities .

Unbalanced Growth as a Strategy

Rejecting the balanced growth thesis (Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse), Hirschman contended that scarce decision-making capacity and limited resources required prioritization.

By investing in strategic sectors, governments could induce complementary investments (induced decision-making), creating momentum.

Linkage Effects

Introduced the influential concepts of backward and forward linkages:

➤Backward linkages: new industries create demand for inputs (e.g., steel plants spurring mining, machinery).

➤Forward linkages: outputs provide inputs for other industries (e.g., steel enabling construction and manufacturing).

Linkage analysis provided policymakers with a heuristic for choosing industries that maximize spillover effects.

Investment Sequences

Distinguished between Social Overhead Capital (SOC) (infrastructure like power, transport) and Directly Productive Activities (DPA) (factories, farms).

The strategic challenge is sequencing SOC and DPA to generate inducements rather than bottlenecks.

Government’s Role

Government should not attempt omniscient comprehensive planning. Instead, it should act as a catalyst, deliberately creating pressures and responding to induced demands.

This approach emphasized incrementalism, experimentation, and adaptive capacity rather than grand plans .

Contribution and Influence

Paradigm Shift: Hirschman redefined development as a dynamic process of problem-solving under constraints, not the achievement of static equilibrium.

Practical Heuristic: His linkage framework remains central in development policy and industrial strategy.

Psychological Insight: He emphasized the mobilization of “hidden, scattered, or badly utilized” resources through inducement mechanisms —a human-centred perspective often missing in abstract growth models.

Influence: The book shaped Latin American development debates, informed industrial policy worldwide, and anticipated later “growth pole” and systems thinking approaches.

Critiques

Overgeneralization: Hirschman himself admitted the theoretical and anecdotal nature of his work .

Neglect of Political Constraints: While noting governance functions, he underestimated entrenched interests, corruption, and political resistance.

Ambiguity in Implementation: “Deliberate imbalance” is conceptually elegant but risky—misplaced investments could lock economies into unproductive paths.

Historical Limits: Some assumptions (e.g., state capacity to steer linkages effectively) may not hold in contemporary fragile states.

Contemporary Relevance

Industrial Policy Revival: In an era of supply chain realignment and strategic sectors (AI, green energy), Hirschman’s emphasis on linkages offers a guide for prioritization.

Systems Thinking Alignment: His disequilibrium model resonates with modern system dynamics and feedback economics.

Nigeria’s Case: For economies dependent on raw exports, his ideas encourage moving up the value chain by targeting industries with strong backward and forward linkages (e.g., petrochemicals, agro-processing).

Conclusion

Albert Hirschman’s The Strategy of Economic Development remains a foundational text in development economics. Its central message, that progress arises from managing and exploiting imbalances rather than eliminating them, challenged orthodoxy and offered a strategy rooted in realism, creativity, and incremental experimentation.

It is less a prescriptive manual than an invitation to think strategically about development as a process of induced responses, where pressure and scarcity can become engines of transformation.

PART III - System 1: Choosing the Operational Logic of a Presidency

Introduction: The Hidden Choice Every Presidency Makes

In our last post, we explored System 3 of the Nigerian Presidency as the internal control centre responsible for creating coherence across government operations. But coherence is only possible once you decide what you’re trying to cohere.

Every presidency faces an often-unspoken but decisive design choice: How will we structure our operational units (System 1) to deliver on our promises?

Most governments default to the inherited architecture of ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs). But that is only one of several possible organising logics, each with its own strengths, weaknesses, and political implications.

Here, we outline four distinct ways the Tinubu Presidency could organise its System 1 for delivery.

Four Competing Logics for Organising System 1

Option 1 - The Familiar Path: MDA-Based Delivery

♦ Logic: Work through the existing ministries, departments, and agencies.

♦ Pros: Familiar, politically safe, immediate implementation.

♦ Cons: Fragmentation, silos, duplication of effort, weak cross-sector integration.

♦ Example: Ministry of Works builds roads, Ministry of Power handles electricity, but no integrated “infrastructure system” linking both.

Option 2 - The Structural Path: Beckford’s Fundamental vs. Social Infrastructure

♦ Logic: Reorganise around two spheres from John Beckford’s Intelligent Nation model: (i) Fundamental Infrastructure (includes Energy, Water, Waste, Transport, ICT, Agriculture, Environment) and (ii) Social Infrastructure (consisting of Education, Health, Commerce, Housing, Public Administration, Defence, Justice, Tourism).

♦ Pros: Links delivery to systemic viability; focuses on foundational capacities.

♦ Cons: Requires structural overhaul; bureaucratic and political pushback likely.

♦ Example: Linking roads, ports, and energy into a single “national capability platform.”

Option 3 - The Promise Path: Pure VSM-by-Promise

♦ Logic: Treat each electoral promise as its own viable system, with dedicated Systems 1–5.

♦ Pros: Outcomes-driven, cross-cutting, agile.

♦ Cons: Complex to coordinate; demands strong System 2 and 3; risks conflict with MDA turf.

♦ Example: “1 million digital jobs” as a System 1 composed of Education, Youth, ICT, Labour, and private sector actors.

Option 4 - The Catalytic Path: Promise Model (Intelligent Nation Model) Overlaid with Developmental Economics

♦ Logic: Prioritise promises based on catalytic impact, using developmental economics insights (e.g., Hirschman’s linkage effects, unbalanced growth strategy).

♦ Pros: Maximises leverage; integrates economic theory with delivery.

♦ Cons: Politically hard - prioritisation means deferring some promises.

♦ Example: Choosing power-sector reform before agriculture expansion because energy enables multiple other sectors.

Why Governance Is a Wicked Problem

Governance is inherently complex i.e. a wicked problem. It is not wicked because it is malicious, but because it is systemic, interconnected, and resistant to simple solutions. The challenge of System 1 design reveals this vividly. Furthermore, whichever organising logic is adopted will have to engage with structural, market and social realities the presidency can't fully control.

Fragmented Economic Reality

Nigeria is a mixed economy, with services delivered by both public and private actors. This uneven reality makes recursion inconsistent:

♦ In sectors where the government delivers services, System 1 includes full recursion i.e. Systems 2, 3, 4, and 5.

♦ In sectors where the government regulates, recursion is partial, typically Systems 2, 3, and 4.

No single organising logic fits all domains. A structure that works for public hospitals cannot govern fintech regulation or private power generation. Governance, therefore, operates across multiple systemic layers with different rules of viability.

Cross-Cutting Promises in a Fragmented System

Many flagship Renewed Hope Agenda promises cut across sectors:

♦ Job creation for youth and women.

♦ National infrastructure fund implementation.

♦ Food security.

♦ Digital economy expansion.

Delivering these requires stitching together ministries, regulators, and private partners that were never designed to work as one. Even with clear presidential vision, execution depends on coordination among semi-autonomous institutions, each with its own mandates, incentives, and rhythms.

Four Logics in Collision

The presidency faces the collision of four competing organising logics:

♦ Structural inertia (the MDA model).

♦ Systemic viability (Beckford’s framework).

♦ Outcome-driven agility (VSM-by-promise model).

♦ Developmental prioritisation (Hirschman’s linkage strategy).

Each offers partial coherence but none can capture the full complexity. The result is constant tension between reform ambition, political feasibility, and operational bandwidth.

The Deeper Problem: No Cohesive View of the Whole

At its root, governance struggles because there is no unifying view, no mechanism that continuously integrates these perspectives into one evolving picture. This absence of a cohesive frame is what makes governance not just administratively difficult, but conceptually wicked. It explains why reforms rarely outlive their architects and why national plans often collapse under their own contradictions.

Conclusion: Making the Choice Explicit

The presidency must declare which organising logic it is adopting. This choice determines how power, accountability, and learning are structured. It is the foundation upon which coherence (System 3), intelligence (System 4), and purpose (System 5) will rest.

Without an explicit choice, governance becomes a drifting equilibrium, reactive rather than strategic.

In the next post, we will explore System 4, the part of the Viable System Model that gives the presidency the cohesive and coherent view it needs to navigate these wicked problems and adapt in real time.

PART II - System 3: The Hidden Engine of the Reimagined Nigerian Presidency

Introduction

In our ongoing series exploring the Nigerian presidency as a Viable System, we've introduced the broad architecture inspired by Stafford Beer's Viable System Model (VSM). Today, we turn the spotlight onto one of its most critical components: System 3 - the internal command centre responsible for turning visionary goals into coordinated, effective action.

If System 5 sets the overarching purpose and System 4 scans the future, then System 3 is the mechanism that ensures the present works: it allocates resources, maintains internal coherence, and monitors how well the operational units (System 1) are performing. Without a well-designed and properly functioning System 3, no administration, no matter how visionary, can succeed.

What Is System 3?

In VSM terms, System 3 is the internal integration and control function. It acts as the presidential nerve centre, ensuring that ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) work in synergy rather than in silos.

It has three essential functions:

• Resource Allocation: deciding where money, people, and materials should go.
• Performance Management: monitoring operations to ensure they align with central goals.
• Coordination: handling issues that crosscut multiple operational units.

A crucial feature is System 3* - an audit function that gathers independent data from System 1 units, providing an unvarnished picture of actual performance, separate from what is reported upwards through formal channels.

What Should System 3 Look Like in the Nigerian Presidency?

In Nigeria's context, System 3 function is primarily carried out by the Federal Executive Council (FEC) - the main executive decision-making body, where the president, vice president, ministers, and key officials meet to coordinate national policy, approve resource allocation, and review performance. However, a more radical framing is possible using John Beckford's "Intelligent Nation" model (an adaptation of the Viable System Model for the nation-state). 

Beckford reframes System 3 as the steward of national coherence and capability and sees System 3 not just as a controller but a governance integrator that:

• Synthesizes intelligence and performance, ensuring data from operations (System 1) and audits (System 3*) inform adaptive decision-making.
• Stewards Fundamental Infrastructure (Energy - including Oil & Gas, Water, Waste, Transport, ICT, Agriculture and Natural Resources) and Social Infrastructure (Health, Education, Commerce, Manufacturing, Civil Administration, Defence & Public Safety) as the foundation of national viability.
• Monitors capabilities, not just delivery. Instead of simply tracking how many roads or schools are built, System 3 must ask: Has this improved national capacity to function and adapt?
• Constructs coherence, aligning fragmented institutions and policies under a unifying strategic logic. It ensures that each policy or budget allocation contributes to the broader viability of the nation.

Applied to the Tinubu administration, this means:

• Elevating infrastructure oversight beyond procurement into a systemic view of national capability.
• Embedding outcome-based metrics into performance dashboards.
• Positioning the Federal Executive Council as a coherence body, not just a policy-approval forum.
• Using tools like the Renewed Hope Infrastructure Fund not merely for funding but for strategic integration.

In short, Beckford urges us to see System 3 as the consciousness of government performance, linking action, reflection, and purpose.

Designing System 3 for success requires:

• Clear Accountability: Each unit must know its responsibilities and how they connect to the larger mission.
• Lean Coordination Mechanisms: Avoiding bloated bureaucracies by empowering small, agile teams to handle cross-ministry coordination.
• Digital-First Monitoring: Leveraging technology for performance tracking, rather than relying solely on paper reports or verbal updates.
• Strong System 4 Interface: Feeding insights and trends from future-scanning efforts into present-day operational decisions.

Examples from the Renewed Hope Agenda include the national infrastructure campaign, modernizing water supply systems, and building a digital economy; all of which require an integrative System 3 that can steer complex, multi-stakeholder projects.

What Metrics Should It Track?

To support real-time decision-making and transparent delivery tracking, System 3 in the Reimagined Presidency would benefit from a structured Performance Dashboard aligned with the Renewed Hope Agenda. Here's a sketch of how it might look:

To function effectively, System 3 needs to monitor the right metrics. Some priority areas include:

🔑 Core Economic Metrics

* GDP growth (target \~7% per year)

* Job creation (targeting over 50 million jobs)

* Poverty reduction (lifting 100 million people out of poverty)

* Non-oil export contribution to GDP

* Manufacturing sector share of GDP

* Revenue-to-GDP ratio (target: 22%)

* Debt-to-GDP ratio and debt servicing costs

⚙ Fiscal and Monetary Metrics

* Budget execution rates (especially capital vs. recurrent)

* Growth in internally generated revenue (IGR)

* Reduction in fiscal leakages via automation and reforms

* Exchange rate stability and transparency

* Inflation rate (target: \~13%)

* Interest rate (target: \~9%)

📆 Infrastructure and Sectoral Metrics

* Crude oil production (target: 4mmbpd by 2030)

* Electricity generation and per capita consumption (target: 1,000kWh by 2050)

* Gas flaring reduction and domestic utilization rates

* Km of highways constructed or rehabilitated

* Potable water supply coverage (goal: 5-minute proximity)

* Broadband penetration and digital service delivery rates

🏥 Social Metrics

* Population covered by National Health Insurance (target: 40% in 2 years)

* Maternal and infant mortality rates

* STEM and general school enrollment rates

* Teacher qualification rates

* % of political appointments under age 40 (target: 20%)

* % of senior government roles held by women (target: 35%)

🔍 Governance and Institutional Metrics

* Implementation progress of Oronsaye Report reforms

* Uptake and effectiveness of e-governance systems

* Reduction in ghost workers/projects and leakages

* Delivery timelines for Renewed Hope Infrastructure Fund projects

Each of these metrics can be displayed using traffic light indicators (🟢🟡🔴), trend charts, and exception registers, providing the President and coordination bodies with a live window into performance. These metrics also help mitigate the risks of System 3 becoming either overbearing (micromanaging) or invisible (absent control), both of which undermine presidential effectiveness.

Risks and Challenges

A weak or poorly designed System 3 can lead to:

• Fragmentation: Ministries working at cross-purposes, wasting resources.
• Inefficiency: Slow budget releases, stalled projects, unaddressed bottlenecks.
• Inflexibility: A rigid control system that chokes innovation or local adaptation.
• Accountability Gaps: Lack of independent performance checks, allowing poor delivery to go unchallenged.

Thus, System 3 must strike a balance: strong enough to maintain control, flexible enough to enable adaptation.

Conclusion: Marking the Tinubu Presidency by Its Tasks

The Tinubu administration has set itself ambitious goals. To deliver on them, it needs more than good intentions, it needs a robust, well-designed System 3 that links vision to action, aligns resources with goals, and keeps the entire system accountable. Bodies like the Federal Executive Council (FEC) must play a central role in ensuring this coordination happens at the highest level.

In the next post, we will zoom into System 1, the frontline operational units responsible for delivering the fundamental infrastructure projects and services that underpin the Renewed Hope agenda.

By understanding how each part of the Viable System works, we can better appreciate both the promises and the practicalities of building a stronger Nigerian state.

PART I - Reimagining the Nigerian Presidency as a Viable System: Delivering Renewed Hope with Agile Principles

In many democracies, the presidency is constrained by fixed terms, four years, with a possible extension to eight if re-elected. Given the immense complexity of national challenges, what can a president realistically achieve within such a limited window? And how should they structure the machinery of government to maximize delivery? 

This write-up explores how the Nigerian presidency, especially under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu's "Renewed Hope" mandate, could be designed as a Viable System (i.e. a living, adaptive organizational form guided by the principles of Stafford Beer's Viable Systems Model (VSM)) infused with Agile principles to deliver rapid, responsive governance.

The Presidency as a Change Agent

The president is not merely a figurehead or administrator; they are the chief change agent. Elected on a manifesto, the president owes the people transformational leadership. To deliver, they must align and mobilize the state's vast resources (labour and capital) and ensure these resources are structured to achieve their declared objectives.

The "Renewed Hope" agenda sets ambitious goals: economic transformation (aiming for 7% GDP growth, $1trillion economy, and 50million + jobs), infrastructure modernization, energy security, oil sector reforms, expanding the digital economy and more. To turn these from campaign promises into deliverable outcomes, the presidency needs an organizing framework that ensures adaptability, coordination, and feedback: this is where the Viable System Model shines.

Designing the Presidency with the Viable System Model (VSM)

The VSM outlines five key systems that together make an organization viable:

1. System 1 (Operations): The operational units directly delivering services like ministries, agencies, and parastatals implementing policies.

2. System 2 (Coordination): Mechanisms to harmonize and deconflict the activities of System 1, ensuring smooth collaboration across government bodies such as cross-ministry coordination bodies, inter-agency task-forces, project management offices.

3. System 3 (Delivery): The internal governance system ensuring accountability, resource allocation, and performance monitoring.

4. System 4 (Intelligence): The strategic and environmental scanning function, ensuring government adapts to changing circumstances and anticipates future challenges.

5. System 5 (Policy and Identity): The top-level policy and identity-setting system, centred in the President's Office, defining the state's purpose, direction, and core values.

By mapping the Nigerian presidency along these lines, we can ensure that every unit knows its role, is supported by effective coordination, is held accountable, and has mechanisms for learning and adaptation.

Embedding Agile Principles in Governance

To make the VSM structure truly dynamic, the presidency should adopt Agile principles:

• Incremental Delivery: Focus on achieving quick wins, iterating on policies, and adapting based on outcomes.
• Cross-functional Teams: Assemble cross-functional task forces (pulling in ministries, agencies, private sector and civil society) around key priorities (e.g., security, infrastructure, economic transformation) that work in sprints with clear deliverables.
• Feedback Loops: Establish regular feedback from citizens, stakeholders, and the international community, integrating this into System 4 for real-time course correction.
• Transparency and Communication: Use dashboards, public reports, and open data to maintain transparency, build trust, and generate collective momentum.

The Performance and Delivery Unit and Policy Advisory Councils: Early Signals of VSM Thinking

The Tinubu administration has already shown early signs of adopting VSM principles. The creation of a Performance and Delivery Unit reporting directly to the president aligns with System 3, providing a backbone for coordinating delivery, clearing bottlenecks, and ensuring alignment across government machinery. Drawing lessons from Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Malaysia, such units must be nimble, results-focused, and empowered to hold agencies accountable.

In addition, the establishment of Policy Advisory Councils mirrors the role of System 4, providing critical intelligence, strategic thinking, and environmental scanning to help the presidency anticipate future challenges and opportunities. These advisory bodies act as the presidency's radar, ensuring that policy decisions are informed by fresh insights, expert analysis, and stakeholder input.

A Cautionary Note on Maintaining Momentum

While the Tinubu administration hit the ground running, especially in its early months, momentum has slowed, particularly following the cascading economic impact of fuel subsidy removal and FX devaluation and the public backlash that followed. It is crucial for the president to hold fast to the early structures he put in place. The Performance and Delivery Unit must remain honest, focused, and shielded from political dilution. 

Likewise, the Policy Advisory Councils should not become comatose now that some of their key members have transitioned into ministerial and official roles. Maintaining the vitality and independence of these bodies is essential to ensuring adaptive governance and the continued delivery of the "Renewed Hope" agenda. 

Without safeguarding these structures, the presidency risks reverting to reactive, short-term firefighting rather than sustained, systemic transformation, undermining the momentum needed to deliver true change.

Linking Mandate to Execution

The "Renewed Hope" manifesto must not sit as an inert document. Through a VSM-based design, the manifesto becomes the reference point for System 5 (defining identity and purpose) while Systems 3 and 4 ensure its continuous translation into adaptive policy and on-the-ground delivery. For example:

• Security reforms (System 1) are coordinated through special interagency task forces (System 2), monitored by the Delivery Unit (System 3), informed by real-time intelligence (System 4), and guided by the president’s overarching security doctrine (System 5).
• Economic goals like manufacturing growth, infrastructure rollout, and digital economy expansion are delivered via agile cross-sector teams, supported by fiscal and regulatory innovation, and iteratively adjusted based on performance data.

Conclusion: A Presidency Built for Viability

A presidency designed as a viable system, infused with agile governance, maximizes the chances of delivering transformational outcomes within the tight constraints of political time. It turns a four- or eight-year window into a period of dynamic, responsive change, where promises are not merely aspirations but operational mandates. For Nigeria under President Tinubu, embracing this systems-based, adaptive approach could be the key to making "Renewed Hope" not just an election slogan but a lived reality for millions.

Next Steps

Future posts will explore concrete examples of how each system could be structured and the metrics for tracking performance.

The Missing Piece in Nigeria's Economic Reforms - A Systems Thinking Lens

Economic policymaking in Nigeria is often framed as a series of targeted interventions: adjust the exchange rate, increase non-oil revenue, liberalize a sector, remove a subsidy. Each move is introduced with the hope that it will produce measurable gains. Yet time and again, such measures fail to deliver durable improvements, or worse, they set off new disruptions elsewhere in the system.

This is not simply a failure of execution or political will. I believe it is a failure of thinking. Most policies in Nigeria rely on a linear cause-and-effect model. But economies are complex adaptive systems characterized by feedback loops, delays, and interdependent variables.

Linear Thinking Meets System Reality

Consider the use of monetary policy to manage inflation and attract foreign portfolio investment (FPI) flows. Policymakers often raise interest rates with the expectation that tighter monetary conditions will reduce inflationary pressures and make naira-denominated assets more attractive to foreign investors, thereby bolstering foreign exchange reserves and stabilizing the currency.

However, as Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie emphasize in Monetary Economics, the effectiveness of such measures depends on the stock-flow dynamics of the economy: the interactions between domestic credit, sectoral balances, and external capital flows.

In practice, elevated interest rates may succeed in attracting short-term FPI inflows, but they also raise the cost of domestic borrowing, depress investment, and slow economic growth. Meanwhile, reliance on volatile capital flows introduces external vulnerability, as shifts in global risk appetite or investor sentiment can trigger sudden reversals, leading to exchange rate instability, the very outcome policymakers sought to prevent.

The linear model (raise rates → stabilize prices and FX → strengthen reserves) breaks down because it ignores the system’s feedback architecture and the trade-offs between domestic growth dynamics and external stabilization efforts.

What Systems Thinking Offers

Systems thinking offers tools to address these structural blind spots. Drawing on the insights of Forrester, Beer, and Godley, systems thinking encourages policymakers to shift attention from events to structures i.e. the patterns of relationships that generate observable outcomes. Specifically, systems thinking helps identify:

• Reinforcing and balancing feedback loops: where actions amplify or dampen effects.
• Time delays: where the consequences of a policy take longer to materialize than expected.
• Compensating behaviours: where the system’s internal adjustments work against imposed change.

Without accounting for these features, even technically sound policies can fail or backfire.

The Case of Fuel Subsidy Removal

Nigeria’s struggle with fuel subsidy removal illustrates the stakes. The logic is straightforward: subsidies are a drain on public finances that the nation can no longer afford and a cesspit for corruption, so removing them should free up much needed resources for productive investment.

But the system’s compensating responses undermine the expected benefits. Subsidy removal immediately leads to hikes in the prices of transport and goods, which sparks inflation, reduces household purchasing power, and provokes public backlash. Politicians, facing pressure, often respond by increasing public sector wages or introducing cash transfers, eroding the fiscal gains they sought.

As Stafford Beer observed in his work on the Viable System Model (Brain of the Firm), complex systems often display homeostasis (a tendency to maintain internal stability even in the face of external change). Without designing reforms to account for the system’s self-regulation, interventions tend to be absorbed or neutralized.

From Policy Firefighting to System Stewardship

What Nigeria needs is not just more reforms, but a fundamentally different approach: one that treats policy as system design rather than isolated event management. This means:

• Developing models that map cross-sectoral flows and feedbacks (drawing on stock-flow consistent frameworks, such as those championed by Godley).
• Stress-testing policy under different scenarios (using system dynamics, like Forrester).
• Designing institutions that can maintain adaptability and coherence over time (using principles from Beer’s Viable System Model).

Such approaches can help Nigeria move from reactive firefighting to proactive system stewardship, managing not just outcomes, but the underlying conditions that produce them.

Conclusion

In future posts, I will explore how systems-based tools can be applied to Nigeria’s fiscal strategy, external balances, credit structures, and institutional frameworks. My aim is not to offer quick fixes, but to deepen the conversation around structural coherence because without it, no policy can endure.

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“For Nigeria to endure, its institutions must stop managing events and start managing structures.”

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